

State fragility, organised crime and peacebuilding: towards a more strategic approach

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Executive summary

Fragile states, with their ready pools of unemployed labour, populations inured to violence and weakened state capacity, offer sites of competitive advantage for militant organisations, criminal networks and political leaders alike. Collaboration among them may benefit all three – financing militancy, protecting crime and securing political control. Criminal networks threaten not only to fuel conflict, but also to undermine post-war gains – by criminalising politics and instrumentalising continuing disorder, thereby creating pervasive fragility in the international system.

Yet the international community currently lacks a coherent approach to tackling organised crime in conflict-affected communities. This report argues that there are normative, analytical and practical obstacles to the development of an effective response.

Firstly, at the normative level, sovereignty represents a constraint on international action, especially where crime and politics are intertwined.

Secondly, there is analytical confusion regarding how to understand and respond to organised criminal actors in peacebuilding

contexts. Security-oriented actors tend to treat organised criminals as potentially violent spoilers of peace processes – or potential partners for peace – and focus on coercion, negotiation and compromise. Development actors tend to focus on addressing the structural factors – such as high unemployment, access to weapons and access to profitable illicit markets – that criminal entrepreneurs exploit. These different approaches are poorly integrated and sometimes compete outright.

Thirdly, there are numerous obstacles to the international mobilisation and organisation of the capacity needed to tackle organised crime effectively, particularly specialist investigative resources and analytical expertise.

The report suggests treating organised crime as a strategy of governance, and differentiates among different strategies (predatory, parasitic, symbiotic) that may pose different threats to peacebuilding. Finally, it proposes a series of specific steps that might be taken immediately and in the medium and long term to equip peacebuilders with the analysis, tools and capacity they need to mount a more strategic response.

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Abbreviations and acronyms

DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNODC	UN Office on Drugs and Crime

1. What is the problem?

The international community currently lacks a coherent approach to tackling the impact of organised crime on conflict-affected communities. As the recently published World Bank *World Development Report 2011* bluntly states: “the international system has not been adjusted to keep pace with the emerging analysis of conflict – in particular, recognition of the repetitive and interlinked nature of conflict, and the increasing challenge of organized crime and trafficking.”¹ While there is a growing recognition that transnational criminal networks threaten not only to fuel conflict, but also to undermine post-war gains – by criminalising politics and instrumentalising continuing disorder, thereby creating pervasive fragility in the international system – our understanding of how to respond to these new challenges remains limited.

Fragile states, with their ready pools of unemployed labour and populations who are injured to and traumatised by violence, frequently represent sites of competitive advantage for militants, criminal networks and violent political leaders alike. Collaboration among them may benefit all three – financing militancy, protecting crime and securing political control.² In Afghanistan, the Karzai regime depends significantly for its support on drug-trafficking warlords, many with close, but clandestine ties to the Taliban.³ In

Kosovo, the rebel force that became the post-war ruling party is accused of profiting from drug and organ trafficking.⁴ In Nigeria, development and democracy are both threatened by an oil-stealing rebellion in the south-east, which is increasingly dabbling in terrorist tactics. In West Africa and the Sahel, major flows of cocaine from South America are fuelling the criminalisation of politics and a growing kidnapping and ransom market, which is in turn fuelling al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.⁵ In East Africa, the licit economy is steadily being swamped by revenues from piracy, and human and drug trafficking, rewarding criminal-political entrepreneurialism. And in the Americas and Caribbean, of course, the relationship among criminal entrepreneurs, political patrons and violent paramilitary proxies is now deeply entrenched, infecting much of Central America, with violence and corruption increasingly affecting the southern states of the United States. This convergence suggests a number of problematic impacts on peacebuilding efforts caused by organised crime, which are discussed below.

Firstly, as we have seen in Central America, transnational criminal groups' infiltration of fragile states may represent an external stressor weakening domestic governance and making such states more vulnerable to violent competition between domestic or transnational rivals. Apparently stable states may have been “hollowed out” by criminal networks and therefore become susceptible to coups and

1 World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*, Washington, DC, World Bank, 2011, p 181. See also pp 67-68, 78-81.

2 Britt Sloan and James Cockayne, “Terrorism, crime, and conflict: exploiting the differences among transnational threats?”, Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Policy Brief, February 2011, <http://www.globalct.org>.

3 Citha D. Maass, *Afghanistan's Drug Career: Evolution from a War Economy to a Drug Economy*, Afghan Analysts Network Thematic Report 02/2011, March 2011, <http://www.aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1615>.

4 See Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, “Inhuman treatment of people and trafficking in human organs in Kosovo”, Document AS/Jur (2010) 46, 12 December 2010.

5 James Cockayne and Phil Williams, “The invisible tide: towards an international strategy to deal with drug trafficking through West Africa”, International Peace Institute Policy Paper, 2009, <http://www.ipacademy.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/244-the-invisible-tide-towards-an-international-strategy-to-deal-with-drug-trafficking-through-west-africa.html>.

collapse – as in Guinea-Bissau. This may lead to violence against civilians, forcing peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions – as in Guinea or Kyrgyzstan.

Secondly, because many organised crime groups and illicit markets function transnationally, law enforcement efforts in one place may have unpredictable displacement effects, undermining peacebuilding efforts in the neighbourhood – or even further abroad. Efforts to control cocaine production and trafficking in Central America and the Caribbean have led to significant “balloon” effects not only within this region, but also beyond – e.g. displacing major cocaine flows into West Africa. At present, peacebuilding analyses and responses have little hope of predicting and preventing such knock-on effects, leaving peacebuilding efforts vulnerable to unexpected and apparently uncontrollable setbacks, and to significant resource waste.

Thirdly, in some cases the criminalisation of state organs may undermine the value of state consent – and render peacebuilding interventions, which are dependent on state consent and local ownership, effectively impotent. There are strong signs of such developments in Afghanistan, Somalia and, on occasion, Haiti.

Fourthly, it seems possible that participation in transnational criminal networks may not just weaken the authority of *states*, but also the authority of *nations* and the other sources of social capital that have traditionally underpinned states’ social contracts. In many parts of Latin America, for example, human security is controlled as much by transnational drug-trafficking organisations and gangs (especially the *maras*) as it is by territorial states. In Somalia, the connection between clan allegiance and criminal revenues easily eclipses the pull of the state, even when the former stretch across borders or around the world. Up to this point, there is little if any thinking on how traditional models of peacebuilding may need to be adapted to deal with such a transnationalisation of violence. Clearly, one basic adjustment may need to be the adaptation of the single-state mandates currently given to peace operations and peacebuilding efforts, perhaps to embrace more regionalised arrangements. Yet, as I explore below, the doctrine of state consent stands as a fundamental barrier to such an approach.

Fifthly, the convergence of crime, politics and organised violence represents a real threat to human security and development. Homicide rates in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, for example, outstrip those of many countries recognised as being “in conflict”. The recently published *World Development Report 2011* estimates the economic impact of organised crime in Central America and the Caribbean as being on a similar scale to the impact of civil war and suggests that violence is the main constraint to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.⁶ A group of experts recently convened by the UK government to predict conflict trends in 2030 identified numerous factors that seem likely to amplify the role played by organised criminal groups in the international system in the next two decades.⁷

Yet the international system is poorly equipped to meet these challenges. Responding to organised crime has only recently been treated as a valid object of international peace efforts, e.g. through the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s attention to Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Guinea, and the UN Security Council’s recognition of drug trafficking and organised crime as potential threats to international peace and security.⁸ In some peacebuilding cases, we have – by our own admission – a very weak understanding of the relationship between political power and criminal financing on the ground – e.g. piracy in Somalia. In other cases, we think we understand what is going on, but we have limited political will to deal with the nexus of crime and politics – e.g. Haiti. Where we do have the political will, we frequently disagree on how we can best go about disentangling crime from politics – e.g. Afghanistan. In some cases, we can agree on how to do it, but find we do not have the tools and capacity we need – e.g. Guinea-Bissau. In other cases, we create new tools, only to find they struggle to compete with organised crime – e.g. Guatemala. And in some cases, we just simply turn a blind eye, because we are quite happy to let our allies – our partners for peace – be financed by organised crime – arguably Kosovo in the early 2000s. Finally, we sometimes

6 World Bank, *World Development Report 2011*, p 65.

7 Wilton Park, *Global Conflict – Future Trends and Challenges: Towards 2030*, conference report, WP1073, April 2011, <http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc1012/hc12/1256/1256.pdf>.

8 UNSC (UN Security Council), Presidential Statements 2009/32, 8 December 2009, and 2010/4, 24 February 2010.

just seem to give up, because a community does not seem sufficiently strategically important, leaving whole communities in strategic ghettos at the mercy of violent transnational criminal organisations – e.g. parts of Latin America and West Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Central Asia.

These shortcomings in our attempts to arrest the impact of organised crime on state fragility and peacebuilding seem to stem from three types of obstacles: normative, analytical and practical.

1.1 The normative problem: when sovereignty protects crime

One fundamental constraint is normative. The international system is founded on the norm of state sovereignty. International military, developmental and justice interventions still require state consent. States are reluctant to take direction from the international community on how they should deal with criminal groups, since the exercise of investigative and prosecutorial power is traditionally so close to the heart of sovereignty – it is an expression of the sovereign state's monopoly on legitimate force. In weak states, from Guatemala to Afghanistan to Kosovo, criminal networks with ties to government have used sovereignty as a shield to obstruct and resist effective international action.

Deep thinking is required on how to address this thorny normative question: for as long as international investigations, disruption and prosecution of organised crime rely on state cooperation and consent, international peacebuilders will be at a fundamental disadvantage in their competition with criminals to influence the future of insecure and fragile states. New international regimes that permit international intervention in the event of a state's failure to protect human rights, without state consent – such as the doctrine of complementarity and the concept of joint criminal enterprise, as well as the norm of the Responsibility to Protect – are not yet seen as applying to states' failures to tackle large-scale criminal enterprises operating for profit. The UN Peacebuilding Commission's efforts in West Africa have all been undertaken with state consent; and the UN Security Council's Presidential Statements have not yet crystallised into any binding action by the council relating purely to organised crime, although some have argued for the

imposition of sanctions on narco-trafficking political and military leaders in Guinea-Bissau. Even where criminal enterprises' operations are widespread and systematic, are protected by governmental elements, and arguably do greater harm than some small-scale conflicts, the norms and institutions developed to justify international intervention against other international crimes are not yet understood to apply to organised crime. Instead, the international regime for responding to organised crime, based on the 11-year-old Palermo Convention, works on the basis of decentralised, state-based cooperation. It is arguably as weak an enforcement tool today as the repression of war crimes was before the advent of collective enforcement mechanisms such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court.⁹

This over-emphasis on state consent plays into the hands of criminal enterprises: transnationalised operations and money-laundering arrangements are beyond the investigative reach of any one country. Corruption and governmental sponsorship at key locations in global illicit supply chains provide an additional hedge against disruption by international law enforcement. Moreover, the emphasis on state consent creates significant incoherence in international efforts to resolve conflict and build peace, because it leaves international actors uncertain whether a specific individual – involved in serious crime, but wielding significant military and/or political power – should be treated as a potential partner for peace or a target for law enforcement. Afghanistan is the paradigmatic case: narco-trafficking warlords in government are treated as partners for peace; narco-trafficking warlords in the opposition are treated as targets for law enforcement and military action. Yet they all contribute to the functioning of the illicit supply chains that fuel Afghanistan's conflict and structure its political and economic life. The resulting tensions between "peace" and "justice" closely resemble those discussed at length in the last two decades in the field of transitional justice – yet to date little work has been done to explore if or how lessons from that field might inform how we address organised crime in conflict-affected states.

⁹ See André Standing, *Transnational Organized Crime and the Palermo Convention: A Reality Check*, New York, International Peace Institute, December 2010.

1.2 The analytical problem: different understandings of organised crime

As the above analysis suggests, on closer inspection, this normative obstacle to effective action is closely related to a broader analytical confusion within the international community's approach to tackling organised crime in conflict-affected spaces. Different actors implicitly disagree whether to treat organised crime as a political *actor* within the peacebuilding process, to be contained through reactive bargaining and coercion; or whether to treat it as a structural *factor* that peacebuilding should seek to address through structural transformation, e.g. through development-style programming.

1.2.1 The security approach: managing violent criminal actors

International security actors tend to treat organised criminals as political and military *actors* – and correspondingly develop responses based on an assessment of the relationship of these actors not only to violence, but to local state-making processes and political stability. This approach finds its intellectual roots in historical sociological accounts of the emergence of early modern European states through bargaining between rural warlords, who imposed protection rackets, and the emerging town-based merchant capitalist class.¹⁰ The containment of the harmful effects of organised criminal activity was achieved through bargaining and compromise between these two groupings, slowly forging a social contract that balanced coercion and capital, thus institutionalising and constraining the use of force.

The current security-oriented approach that understands organised crime in these state-making terms treats involvement in such crime as a secondary consideration in determining how to react to the use of violence by a particular actor: it focuses instead primarily on the political and military power the actor wields. The result, however, has not been a strategic approach by international security actors to engaging organised crime, but rather the treatment of counter-crime efforts as technical activities that can be instrumentalised in the pursuit of broader

political or mission goals. The criminal source – and broader social and political impact – of the interlocutor's power is largely obscured.

This pattern is reflected in the approach taken to organised crime by international peace operations over the last two decades.¹¹ In venues as diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kosovo and Somalia, peacekeepers have treated organised crime as a secondary, technical issue during and after the conflict, taking proactive steps to contain it only when it threatened to create generalised violence, bring down the regime backed by the international community or generate a cross-border spillover effect (refugee flows, cross-border violence, etc.).

The result in each place has been the entrenchment of corruption and the normalisation of impunity – a failure, in other words, not only to understand the broader systemic impact of organised criminality and the strategic threat it represents not only to the peacebuilding enterprise, but even to the “do no harm” principle. Democratic institutions, such as elections, have become hollow facades, with politicians fronting for clandestine cliques fuelled by transnational criminal revenues. In the worst cases there is even evidence to suggest that these criminal-political entrepreneurs have prolonged armed conflict to provide the insecure conditions that allow them to run illicit industries – in Afghanistan, drug production and trafficking; in Somalia, piracy; in the Great Lakes, resource trafficking.

The security approach is skewed towards *reacting* to threats once they emerge, rather than preventing the emergence of opportunity structures that criminal entrepreneurs can exploit. As the *World Development Report 2011* summarises:

International diplomats and security actors have been less involved in [preventing] cases of criminal violence; the UN Peacebuilding Commission's role in Guinea-Bissau is an exception. Bilateral counterterrorism and counter-crime programs provide operational support but rarely cross over into supporting political dialogue or development programs.¹²

¹⁰ See, especially, Charles Tilly, “War making and state making as organized crime”, P. B. Evans, D. Rueschmayer and T. Skocpol, eds, *Bringing the State Back In*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985. It seems unhelpful, as Tilly recognises, to use this historical process as a blueprint for building contemporary states, which emerge in the context of highly internationalised aid and revenue flows.

¹¹ See, generally, James Cockayne and Adam Lupel, eds, *Peace Operations and Organized Crime: Enemies or Allies?*, Routledge, forthcoming May 2011.

¹² World Bank, *World Development Report 2011*, pp 184-185.

The UN Security Council now recognises organised crime as a *potential* threat to stability, but leaves it to peace operations and political missions to decide on a case-by-case basis when that threat warrants a specific response.¹³ International interventions designed to build the systemic capacity to address corruption and organised crime – such as the UN’s International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala; the EU Border Assistance Mission in Moldova and Ukraine; the UN and INTERPOL’s West African Coast Initiative to build a small number of transnational crime units; and the emerging UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia focus on regionalised counter-terrorism and counter-crime strategies in Central Asia – are in their infancy. They reflect “local” innovation in response to a pressing problem of peacebuilding, rather than a coherent and coordinated approach to prevention that is developed and promoted from headquarters.

Such local innovation is to be applauded; but it is no substitute for effective analysis and planning at headquarters. As a recent survey conducted by this author and the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) makes clear, the absence of clear analysis, strategic guidance and resource support at headquarters leaves individual missions reliant on their own entrepreneurialism to cobble together an effective response to the local impacts of these transnational threats. The results are likely to be patchy, at best – and hard to sustain.¹⁴

In contrast, more effort has recently gone into developing the intelligence and analytical capacities of national and international security and law enforcement agencies mandated to reactively interdict *specific* criminal enterprises, including in conflict-affected spaces. This is reflected in the growth of the mandate, resources and presence in peacebuilding arenas of organisations such as INTERPOL, Europol, the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency and the US Drug Enforcement Agency. The mandates of these organisations’ activities in these countries are not, as a rule, to transform local interdiction capacity, but rather to contain the impacts of criminal activity in that

country on the interests of the home jurisdiction. As a result, their interventions are necessarily selective, exacerbating local perceptions of partiality in law enforcement and the instrumentalisation of local peacebuilding by foreign powers, weakening the credibility of these efforts.

The resulting interventions tend to be focused on containing the risks posed by organised crime, including by interdicting the activities of organised crime groups and confining their activities to fragile states. This has significant consequences for human security in such states, as well as for political stability and governance. The danger is that fragile states are increasingly treated as “strategic ghettos” in which the international community acquiesces in organised crime providing repressive rule in the absence of legitimate and responsible state authority. “Peacebuilding” thus becomes a cipher for the containment of violence – not the true building of peace.

1.2.2 The development approach: transforming criminalising factors

International development actors, in contrast, tend to view organised crime through the lens of the localised structural *factors* that facilitate violent criminal activity: high unemployment, high income inequality, prior exposure to violence, democratic collapse, low gross domestic product and weak institutional capacity.¹⁵

Many of these factors are anyhow the factors that peacebuilding projects seek to transform. The tendency of development actors is consequently to treat efforts to arrest organised crime as a subset of a larger project of country-specific development and transformation through macroeconomic reform, labour programming and institution-building. These efforts do not, as a rule, differentiate between those factors that produce “general” and “organised” crime, nor do they tackle the links between crime and politics. The danger here is that organised crime as an object of analysis is subordinated to “broader” concerns – and that the specific dangers it poses get lost in the resulting analysis and programming, allowing criminal elements to coopt or altogether spoil development efforts, even capturing the state in extreme cases.

¹³ See UNSC, Presidential Statement 2010/4.

¹⁴ James Cockayne and Camino Kavanagh, “Flying blind? Political mission responses to transnational threats”, *2011 Annual Global Review of Political Missions*, New York, Center on International Cooperation, forthcoming 2011.

¹⁵ See World Bank, *World Development Report 2011*, pp 78-81, esp. p 80.

A review of key development actors' guidance and assessment tools for peacebuilders – including the UN Development Programme's (UNDP) *Governance Indicators: A User's Guide* (2007) and its *Governance in Conflict Prevention and Recovery: A Guidance Note* (2009), the UN Development Group-World Bank *Joint Guidance Note on Integrated Recovery Planning Using Post Conflict Needs Assessments and Transitional Results Frameworks* (September 2007) and the World Bank Social Development Department's *Conflict Analysis Framework* (2005) – reveals that not one of them includes indicators or assessment methodologies for mapping or analysing *organised* as opposed to *general* crime and interpersonal violence; or for assessing the relationship among criminal violence, political sponsorship and conflict risk. The new Rule of Law Indicators developed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) seek to take a comprehensive approach, but also exclude organised crime. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) has recognised that organised crime is a factor in peacebuilding, but has offered no comprehensive guidance on what to do about it.¹⁶

This lacuna is found not only in the analysis and programming of traditional development actors, such as the World Bank and UNDP, but also in the work of the sole specialised international agency that focuses on developing states' counter-crime capacities – the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In the last few years UNODC has developed a number of innovative analyses suggesting a relationship between the presence of organised crime and instability.¹⁷ But it has not developed programming to match that targets the links between crime and politics; instead, its counter-organised crime programming continues to focus on specialist law enforcement training, legislative drafting and drug control in developing states. Its capacity to address the political aspect of organised crime in these states is fundamentally constrained

by the shield of sovereignty. Its work on organised crime remains largely separate from the work of the peacebuilding and development actors within the international system, at times even competing with them for donor funding for justice and security sector reform programmes.

The danger of this developmental approach is consequently that it fails to take seriously the political nature of these projects of transformation, of peacebuilding initiatives – and of organised crime. Criminal activity may be feasible and profitable as a result of the convergence of certain factors into particular, criminogenic opportunity structures, but such opportunities only become problematic for peacebuilding once they are exploited by organisers. These organisers accrue real economic, social and political power, which they can – and do – use to resist transformative peacebuilding projects that may threaten their power base and profit-making opportunities.

Even where development institutions engage in institution-building to develop local justice capacity, support police transformation or create anti-money-laundering infrastructure, they risk creating policies and institutions that can be coopted by corrupted political masters and turned to the latter's own advantage. Local criminal entrepreneurs have used the opportunities presented by market liberalisation and privatisation to launder their criminal profits and violently won power into new political and market positions. Criminal entrepreneurs in venues as diverse as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Liberia, Russia and Somalia have used the process of macroeconomic liberalisation advocated by the international community in the aftermath of violent political transformation to secure a post-crisis foothold, and even to purchase former state assets. These interventions seem to have been based on limited analysis and understanding of the interplay between illicit market dynamics and political authority in the target countries, unintentionally providing criminal actors with a path to post-conflict power, thus undermining peacebuilding.

In the last few years, however, development actors have made some advances in thinking through how to limit the potential for aid to reward organised

16 OECD DAC (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee), *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience*, Paris, OECD, 2008.

17 See, for example, UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime), *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, Vienna, UNODC, June 2010 and *Crime and Instability: Case Studies of Transnational Threats*, Vienna, UNODC, February 2010, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/publications-by-date.html>.

criminality in this way. The key theme here seems to be leveraging international development assistance to stimulate local economies while building accountable state institutions, rather than lining the pockets of civil servants, politicians and oligarchs. The *World Development Report 2011*, for example, places singular emphasis on the need to use international aid to stimulate local job growth – a major departure from the World Bank’s emphasis on labour-market deregulation under the Washington Consensus. Innovative dual-key and oversight programmes such as the Governance and Economic Management Programme in Liberia have demonstrated the feasibility of structuring international giving to ensure not only that it does not foster corruption, but that it actively helps to denormalise it.¹⁸ And perhaps most notably, the World Bank, UNDP and numerous bilateral donors have developed significant expertise in supporting community-based violence reduction programming (such as the Community Violence Reduction Programmes in Haiti, the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan and the Community Safety and Armed Violence Reduction Project in Somalia). All of these innovations might benefit from careful and comprehensive review to identify lessons learned regarding both the kinds of programmes needed to prevent the emergence of organised crime in peacebuilding contexts and, at the project management level, the mechanisms needed to ensure that organised crime actors cannot effectively spoil such transformation projects through the infiltration and corruption of nascent state institutions.

1.2.3 Strategic confusion: what does success look like?

This divergence in the approaches taken to organised crime in peacebuilding contexts – with security actors treating organised criminals as political actors to be managed and development actors treating organised crime as a product of structural factors to be transformed – produces a fundamental strategic confusion. International policymakers seem to have no clear idea of what success in tackling organised crime would look like, how it could be identified and measured, or even what kind of time frame we

18 See further, James Cockayne, “Wrestling with shadows: principled engagement with violent economies and the repressive regimes that rule them”, Morten Pedersen and David Kinley, eds, *Principled Engagement: Promoting Human Rights by Engaging Abusive Regimes*, UN University Press, forthcoming 2011.

should expect success to be measured over: one year? Three years? Twenty years? What are the appropriate metrics: tons of cocaine seized or hectares of poppy eradicated? Numbers of traffickers convicted? Percentages of reduction in organised crime-related deaths? Reductions in extortion prices?

The default position when measuring effectiveness risks being a reliance on *outputs* rather than *outcomes*. Even the *World Development Report 2011* proposes metrics focused on the accessibility and reach of justice resources, and measuring the volume of justice transactions – rather than assessing the quality of justice interventions.¹⁹ Just because crime reporting and prosecutions are down does not mean that organised crime is not present; on the contrary, in some cases reduced violence and crime may indicate that crime has become symbiotic with government.

One potential solution to this problem may be to place greater emphasis on *qualitative* review, including the kind of system of peer review developed by organisations such as the Financial Action Task Force, the Organisation of American States’ Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The more fundamental need, however, is to develop a shared sense of what success looks like – and an understanding of how it might be achieved through international support and intervention. In section 2 of this paper I lay out some ideas for how that thinking might be developed. Clearly, however, additional research is needed on how to monitor and evaluate effective programming in this area.

1.3 The practical problem: absence of capacity

It is important to note one final – and very significant – obstacle to effective responses to organised crime in peacebuilding contexts: the problem of incapacity, both of the analytical and assistance kinds.

1.3.1 Analytical capacity

It can be no surprise, given the normative and analytical confusion detailed above, that the international community has not yet developed analytical capacity that would allow it to identify the impact of organised crime on international strategies

19 World Bank, *World Development Report 2011*, p 260.

for security, development and peacebuilding. Some countries – notably the UK and America – are developing *national* agencies with the capacity to analyse criminal groups’ operations around the world, including in some conflict-affected countries, but only in order to assess and manage the threats these groups pose to their own domestic interests. These intelligence assets are weakly, if at all, connected to these countries’ systems for generating peacebuilding strategies, policies and programming. There are also echoes of this at the international level: the Financial Action Task Force has fostered the development of much deeper financial analytical capacity in the international system through the creation of national financial intelligence units and private-sector reporting obligations. INTERPOL has a limited, but important role as an aggregator of police data relating to organised crime. But again, neither of these infrastructures yet provides analysis that is integrated into international peacebuilding processes.

The decentralised nature of the Palermo Convention (i.e. the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime) regime also means that there is no effective, shared analytical capacity specifically related to organised crime at the international level. UNODC has begun to develop analyses of specific issues, such as Afghan drug production and global human trafficking patterns, that serve as a collective resource for state and international policymakers; but its restricted funding arrangements limit its capacity to provide centralised analysis on many issues. And UNODC is as yet quite removed from conflict analysis and mission planning processes at the UN in New York, notwithstanding the Security Council’s invitation to the Secretariat to integrate such analysis.²⁰

As a result, most international mediators, peace operations, peacebuilders and development interventions enter their target countries essentially “blind” to the dynamics of the local illicit economy, and its connections to political and military power.²¹ There are isolated cases – e.g. in Iraq, Afghanistan and Haiti – where international military coalitions, forced onto the back foot by aggressive local criminal enterprises, have developed effective criminal intelligence capacities in a single operational

theatre. But these cases are exceptional. The UN has done much better at developing investigative teams, operating transnationally, to explore sanctions-busting, international crimes such as war crimes and the financing of international terrorism – but has yet to draw systematically on this expertise in analysing organised crime. The protocols and information-sharing arrangements that would allow integrated threat analysis, such as the inclusion of organised crime in UN conflict analysis and mission planning, or poverty reduction strategy paper preparations, do not yet exist.

Perhaps one of the most important and immediate steps that might be taken, therefore, to strengthen the capacity of peacebuilders to tackle organised crime would be to work with the UN Secretariat – specifically the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, DPA, DPKO, UNODC and UNDP, to take up the Security Council’s invitation in Presidential Statement 2010/4,

to consider these [transnational] threats as a factor in conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated missions’ assessment and planning and to consider including in his reports, as appropriate, analysis on the role played by these threats in situations on its agenda.

The newly created UN Task Force on Organised Crime and Drug Trafficking, co-chaired by DPA and UNODC, offers an important opportunity to develop such integrated, system-wide analysis. At the end of this report I offer some recommendations for the generation of broader analytical capacity available beyond the UN.

1.3.2 Assistance capacity

Even if such integrated analytical capacity is developed, however, a fundamental problem remains: the unavailability of the assistance capacity that would then need to be deployed in peacebuilding contexts. As the *World Development Report 2011* summarises:

Assistance to countries struggling to develop well-governed police, justice, and corrections systems in the face of fluid violent threats is much more limited than assistance available to build military capacity. The supply of personnel is constrained, since states do not have the kinds of reserve capacities in police or criminal justice that they do in their militaries. For

20 See UNSC, Presidential Statement 2010/4.

21 See Cockayne and Kavanagh, “Flying blind?”

justice, the UN's Independent Review on Civilian Capacities found that it was one of the largest lacunae in international civilian mechanisms, despite efforts to fill gaps. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations ... bilateral donors, the Inter-American Development Bank ... the UNDP, and others have each deepened their delivery capacity related to citizen security and justice, and the World Bank has expanded somewhat assistance for legal and judicial issues – but major gaps in personnel and delivery remain.

...
The lack of a clear focal point for criminal justice as a whole in the international system may underpin this problem – remarkably, there are international agencies for a wide range of functions, but no agency charged with taking the lead on criminal justice issues. Fragmentation of financial support for the security sectors and civilian justice functions, due to the current division in what can be counted as “Official Development Assistance under DAC rules” and to the differing financial rules applying under peacekeeping missions and voluntary support in these areas, also exacerbates disconnected approaches on the ground.²²

If this is so for police and criminal justice assistance, it is even more applicable to the kinds of specialised skills and equipment that are needed to tackle organised crime networks, especially when they are intertwined with political power. In truth, however, the absence of a clear lead agency on supporting criminal justice development at the international level is “remarkable” only if one overlooks the problem of state consent outlined at the beginning of this paper (as the *World Development Report 2011* studiously does). States do not like the international community intervening in their justice affairs, because justice is so close to the heart of sovereignty. As the experience with the UN's International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala has shown, this is particularly the case when it comes to organised crime. So the question of how to organise and deploy relevant capacity for tackling not just petty crime, but the kind of crime in which politicians are frequently implicated cannot be treated *just* as a technical or bureaucratic question, although clearly questions of resources, authority and coordination are important. It must also be recognised as posing much deeper normative and political questions. Significant work is needed to develop acceptable answers to these questions.

²² World Bank, *World Development Report 2011*, pp 199-200.

2. Towards a more strategic approach

2.1 Firstly, recognise organised crime as a strategy of governance in peacebuilding contexts

Organised crime is not just an “actor” or a “factor”, but a *strategy* – a strategy used by business, military and political entrepreneurs to gain, hold and wield power within a violent political economy. The challenge for peacebuilders is how to remove the violence from that political economy, taking the social and political capital developed by organised crime groups²³ and folding it into the state, thus strengthening the state. Understanding how to do this will require a better understanding of the power that particular actors enjoy from exploiting criminalising factors at the local and transnational levels. For example, what is the relationship between a warlord's or a politician's electoral or military power and his involvement in an illicit economy? What is the relationship between different types of organised crime and different state-building trajectories? How do different criminal markets and groups relate to different governance strategies in a particular peacebuilding context?

The answers to these questions may vary significantly, depending on the nature of the illicit market – the type of goods and services being traded, the location of the political or military actor or his allies within the supply chain and the nature of competition or collusion within the market. Violence may play a different role as a factor of production, distribution, competition or protection, depending on the answers to these threshold questions. In some cases, such as in southern Afghanistan, violence may be instrumentalised to create generalised insecurity and reduce alternative livelihood opportunities, lowering barriers to participation in the illicit economy and raising barriers to participation in the licit economy.²⁴ In these cases, organised crime seems to adopt a *predatory* strategy and may come to resemble a military phenomenon competing with the state (e.g. Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Somalia).²⁵ In

²³ On organised crime as a source of political capital, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up: Counter-Insurgency and the War on Drugs*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 2010.

²⁴ See, for example, Maass, *Afghanistan's Drug Career*, for an exploration of how this has occurred in Afghanistan.


²⁵ Compare A. P. Lupsha, “Transnational organized crime versus the nation state”, *Transnational Organized Crime*, vol 2, no. 1, 1996, pp 21-48.

other cases, such as Kenya or Jamaica, violence is used as a factor in electoral or military competition to help protect political patronage systems or kleptocratic elites.²⁶ This is a more *parasitic* approach and in some cases may even produce fiefdoms that resemble proto-states (e.g. parts of northern and western Afghanistan, southern Lebanon, some Latin American and Caribbean urban centres, and some of the Kingston “garrisons”).²⁷ In yet other cases, violence is the result of competition among organised criminal groups for control of illicit markets (Mexico) or the patronage of the state (Guinea-Bissau).²⁸ Here, violence may become *sympiotic*, resembling state capture – and may even become an instrument of foreign policy (e.g. Haiti under the military junta, Serbia under Milošević, Guinea-Bissau, North Korea, arguably aspects of Russian foreign policy).

Each of these different “strategies” of organised crime involves a different relationship among the population, organised criminal groups and state power.²⁹ Each, consequently, suggests a different kind of fragility – and a different trajectory for state-building and peacebuilding. Having identified which strategy a particular organisation has adopted or may adopt, peacebuilders will thus be in a better position to develop peacebuilding strategies that control – rather than are spoiled by – organised crime and the violence it generates.

Yet little detailed effort has been put into understanding how or when entrepreneurs choose each of these strategies – or shift from one to another. In particular, there is a need to better understand the relationship between the strategies of organised criminals in peacebuilding contexts and:

- access to illicit markets (local and global);
- access to (and prices of) factors of production and distribution;
- access to (and prices of) coercion;
- access to social capital (or “legitimacy resources”), including those provided by “mediating” institutions such as clans, tribes or other traditional authority structures, or political party structures; and
- anticipated reactions of strategic rivals, including international actors and the state.³⁰



Groups that have easy access to the factors of production and distribution of illegal goods and services into global markets *may* have increased incentives to use coercion against their own or nearby populations to induce them to engage in criminal enterprise – witness Charles Taylor’s sponsorship of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone in order to control that country’s diamond resources. In contrast, where groups have easy access to social capital, such coercion may not be necessary. In such cases, elites *may* coopt such social capital – including control of clan, tribe or state institutions – to organise or acquiesce in crime. (Think of piracy in Somalia or trafficking in pre-independence Kosovo.)

Yet such hypotheses remain largely untested, limiting our understanding of how exposure to transnational illicit flows impacts on conflict termination and post-conflict recovery. This weakens our ability to plan and mount interventions that might alter the opportunity structures and strategies of criminal entrepreneurs. Some of these interventions – such as deradicalisation, gang interventions, demobilisation or community violence-reduction initiatives – may seek to raise the costs for individuals and social groups of using violence as a strategy of entrepreneurialism or dispute resolution. But effective programming design will require a careful analysis of the relationship among criminal enterprises, markets and social groups. Structural reforms that reduce the profitability of

26 See Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, Bloomington, James Currey & Indiana University Press, 1999.

27 See Stergios Skaperdas and Constantinos Spyropoulos, “Gangs as primitive states”, Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman, eds, *The Economics of Organised Crime*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp 61-84.

28 See, generally, *Crime, Law & Social Change*, vol 52, no. 3, 2009, special issue on illicit markets and violence, pp 225-336, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/0925-4994/52/3/>.

29 See, further, James H. Mittelman and Robert Johnston, “The globalization of organized crime, the courtesan state, and the corruption of civil society”, *Global Governance*, vol 5, no. 1, January-March 1999, pp 103-126.

30 This adapts an approach developed in Francisco Gutierrez Sanin and Antonio Giustozzi, “Networks and armies: structuring rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan”, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, vol 33, no. 9, pp 836-853.

criminal violence or make other livelihoods more attractive, thereby undoing the competitive advantage violent entrepreneurs enjoy, may also be important in these cases – but will require better analysis of illicit markets than peacebuilders can currently access. Other interventions that focus on disrupting violent actors and their organisations may be particularly important for predatory actors and ringleaders, but require intelligence capacities and disruption tools that are rarely discussed in the peacebuilding context. And reforms based on breaking the link between criminal and political power (such as vetting, political party reform, electoral financing reform and anti-corruption initiatives) may be particularly important in the case of symbiotic groups – but, again, require extensive further analysis and development.

2.2 Secondly, build a more strategic response: some recommendations

In order to tackle organised crime as a potential obstacle to sustainable peacebuilding, peacebuilders thus need access to a range of norms, tools and capacities that would allow them to strategically reshape the opportunity space in which criminal entrepreneurs operate, redirecting the political and social capital controlled by organised crime towards licit, non-violent political and economic activities. In the remainder of this report I present eight recommendations for steps that might be taken in the short and medium term, and goals for the longer term, to give peacebuilders access to these norms, tools and capacities.

2.2.1 Immediate priorities: kickstart analysis: develop threat assessment tools and policy

There is a need to rapidly scale up efforts to analyse the relationship among organised crime, peace operations and peacebuilding, and to develop policies and assessment tools based on this analysis. Recommendations for initial priorities therefore include the following:

Recommendation 1: Support the creation of a *research and policy engine* to fast-track the development of analysis, policy tools, metrics and thinking on response capacity in this area. Working with a research network drawn from governments, practitioners and academia, this engine should prioritise:

- comparative analysis of the strategies adopted by different criminal entrepreneurs in a range of peacebuilding contexts, with particular attention to the relationship between the strategies of organised criminals in peacebuilding contexts and access to illicit markets, factors of production and distribution, coercion, and social capital;
- critical analysis of the mandates, resourcing and impacts of special representatives of the UN Secretary-General, mediators, political missions, peace operations, UN Peacebuilding Commission mandates, international military interventions and international criminal justice mechanisms on the question of responding to organised criminal groups and illicit markets;
- analysis of the implications of the nexus between organised crime and political power specifically for international mediation efforts;
- analysis of the implications of the nexus between organised crime and military power specifically for international peace operations (including use of force guidance, force structures, joint mission analysis centres and concepts of operations);
- lessons learned specific to organised crime from armed violence reduction programming, gang intervention programming, and the field of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration;
- lessons learned from the UN’s experience developing a regime to react to maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia;
- an examination of the criminalising effect of sanctions³¹ and the potential use of sanctions and sanctions panels, and other international criminal investigators (e.g. those working currently in international tribunals) to identify and prevent destabilisation caused by organised crime in fragile states; and
- the stimulation of deeper, longer-term (possibly longitudinal) research into the relationship

31 See, generally, Peter Andreas, “Criminalizing consequences of sanctions: embargo busting and its legacy”, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol 49, 2005, pp 335–360.

among different development, macroeconomic reform and state-building strategies and the trajectory of organised crime.

Recommendation 2: Drawing on the analysis developed by this research and policy hub, *organised crime threat assessment tools should be developed*. These should include:

- risk indicators – and where possible metrics – to be integrated into existing international conflict analysis and development needs assessment tools, and to supplement the new Rule of Law Indicators;
- assessment methodologies and templates that can be deployed by a range of national, regional, international and private-sector practitioners; and
- programming metrics and country-level progress assessment tools, including options for qualitative and peer-review assessments.

Recommendation 3: The outputs from the above activities could be fed into a *discussion of the development of transnational analytical capacity*, particularly capitalising on the Security Council's invitation to the UN Secretariat to

consider these [transnational] threats as a factor in conflict prevention strategies, conflict analysis, integrated missions' assessment and planning and to consider including in his reports, as appropriate, analysis on the role played by these threats in situations on its agenda.

This could occur through the new UN Task Force on Organised Crime and Drug Trafficking. Developing such an approach would require:

- mapping existing sources of relevant data within the UN system, and beyond (UNODC, peace operations, UN country teams, UN political missions, sanctions expert groups, international criminal tribunals, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the World Bank, national financial intelligence units, INTERPOL);

- developing protocols for information sharing, data reporting and joint analysis;
- workshopping potential adjustments to institutional mandates to allow improved and streamlined analysis; and
- exploring options for partnerships with civil society and academia to gather and analyse data on organised crime activity (e.g. on the model of the national and regional drugs observatories found in Latin America and Europe).

2.2.2 Medium-term steps: guidance, programming and response capacity

Recommendation 4: Using the analysis and tools developed under recommendations 1, 2 and 3, the next step would be the development of *guidance tools*, such as:

- guidance for mediators on mapping illicit economic interests in peace processes and handling parties involved with organised crime;
- guidance for mission leadership, including case studies and lessons learned;
- training for peacekeeping, peacebuilding, UN country team and other relevant personnel (e.g. perhaps OHCHR staff) on the nature and impact of organised crime, how to assess risk factors, and effective policy and programming responses; and
- OECD DAC guidance on programming to counter organised crime in fragile states.

Recommendation 5: Looking ahead, consideration should be given to conducting a *strategic review of international capacity to assist states to develop multisectoral capacity to fight organised crime and related transnational threats*. This requires thinking about:

- models for integrated in-country technical support teams and financial support, combining economic, governance and public finance expertise with security, police and judicial personnel;³²

³² See World Bank, *World Development Report 2011*, pp 272-276.

- the coordination and streamlining of the efforts undertaken by the numerous actors providing such assistance. Within the UN system alone, for example, the following agencies currently provide technical assistance, guidance and support to fragile states to tackle transnational criminal networks: UNDP, UNODC, DPA, DPKO, UN special political missions, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and the Rule of Law Coordination and Resources Group;
- the adoption of international pooled funding mechanisms (perhaps linked to the UN Peacebuilding Fund) and/or peer-review assessment arrangements, along the lines of the Financial Action Task Force, the Organisation for American States Inter-American Drug Control Commission Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism or NEPAD, in order to incentivise progress on these issues; and
- the development of complementary investigative and enforcement capacity to discharge states' obligations to tackle organised crime, along the lines of the regime developed to deal with war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

Recommendation 6: Together with the consideration of such institutional questions, there is also a need to leverage research and analysis undertaken under recommendations 1 and 2 to generate *substantive programming ideas*, particularly in the following ideas:

- democracy promotion and electoral support: the criminalisation of electoral financing and political power in many fragile states requires increased attention to international scrutiny of electoral financing arrangements, political party development and broader political corruption;³³
- community-led dispute resolution, violence reduction and counter-gang initiatives, including reintegration programming;

- macroeconomic policy reform, including vetting and lustration mechanisms in public tender processes, regional pricing mechanisms to reduce incentives for cross-border smuggling and labour-intensive infrastructural projects; and
- social programming, including civil society mobilisation around anti-corruption and counter-crime initiatives. These might draw more extensively on traditional authority structures or initiatives in the developed world designed to mobilise small business against mafia extortion.

2.2.3 Longer-term goals: normative development

Finally, it is important to consider longer-term goals if we are to develop a more strategically flexible toolkit for peacebuilders to draw on. This may require particular attention to strengthening *normative* arrangements and the institutions used to enforce existing norms, for example:

Recommendation 7: We should think about how to better *enforce international law*. This would involve supporting research into the adaptation of the existing system of international criminal law to efforts to tackle organised crime. What concepts and tools does international law offer in developing international capacity to tackle transnational organised crime? Do we need to look beyond decentralised cooperation regimes such as the Palermo Convention towards the adaptation of doctrines such as joint criminal enterprise, the Responsibility to Protect or the principle of complementarity to underpin supranational monitoring of states' efforts to tackle organised crime?

Recommendation 8: We should identify *inconsistencies between existing regimes* – e.g. the tension between the international narcotics control regime and the political approach to peacebuilding – to clarify the roles of different international actors in determining whether political/military/criminal entrepreneurs are to be handled as potential partners for peace or targets for law enforcement. This decision is currently taken through uncoordinated, decentralised processes, frequently leading to international actors working at cross purposes – as in Afghanistan. This can only undermine our collective peacebuilding efforts.

³³ See Camino Kavanagh, *Seminar on Organized Crime and State Capture, Lima, Peru, 9-11 February 2011*, meeting report, New York, Center on International Cooperation, March 2011, <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/index.html>.

Further reading

UNSC PRST 2010/4, 24 February 2010, <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/PRST/2010/4>.

Recognises organised crime and other transnational threats as a potential threat to stability, and invites the UN Secretary-General to integrate analysis of these threats into conflict analysis, mission planning and other activities.

World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*, Washington, DC, World Bank, 2011, <http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/home>.

Comprehensive examination of the relationship among organised violence (both criminal and political), insecurity and development. Treats transnational organised crime as an external "stressor" on fragile states. Looks at policies, programming and institutional support needed to break the connection between insecurity and under-development, emphasising "citizen security, justice and jobs".

UN Office on Drugs and Crime, *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*, Vienna, UNODC, June 2010 and *Crime and Instability: Case Studies of Transnational Threats*, Vienna, UNODC, February 2010, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/publications-by-date.html>.

Two reports from UNODC, one providing an overview of global illicit markets and the other examining the relationship between transnational crime and political instability.

James Cockayne and Adam Lupel, eds, *Peace Operations and Organized Crime: Enemies or Allies?* Cass Series on Peacekeeping, Routledge, May 2011, <http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415601702/>.

The only book-length study of the relationship between peace operations and organised crime. It includes studies by Will Reno on West Africa; Connie Friesendorf on Kosovo; Roland Marchal on Somalia; James Cockayne on Haiti; Phil Williams on Iraq; Peter Andreas on Bosnia; Patrick Gavigan on Guatemala; Vanda Felbab-Brown on Afghanistan; Rob Muggah and Keith Krause on armed violence reduction; and Victoria Holt and Alix Boucher on sanctions panels.

James Cockayne, "Crime, corruption and violent economies", Mats Berdal and Achim Wennmann, eds, *Ending Wars, Consolidating Peace: Economic Perspectives*, London, Routledge/IISS, 2010, pp 189-218, <http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/adelphis-2010/ending-wars-consolidating-peace-economic-perspectives/>.

An extended analysis on some of the themes addressed in this report, with a particular focus on understanding the relationship among predatory, parasitic and symbiotic organised crime.

Camino Kavanagh, *Seminar on Organized Crime and State Capture*, Lima, Peru, 9-11 February 2011, meeting report, New York, Center on International Cooperation, March 2011, <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/index.html>.

A report on a meeting of academics, investigative journalists and other experts from Latin America and West Africa to explore the dynamics of state capture by organised crime in each region. It contains numerous useful ideas for further research and policy development.

Charles Tilly, "War making and state making as organized crime", P. B. Evans, D. Rueschmayer and T. Skocpol, eds, *Bringing the State Back In*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985, <http://www.jesusradicals.com/wp-content/uploads/warmaking.pdf>.

A seminal article explaining the emergence of early modern European states as the result of a bargaining process between organised-crime-like warlords and merchant capitalists.

Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up: Counter-Insurgency and the War on Drugs*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/press/Books/2009/shootingup.aspx>.

A uniquely detailed and policy-relevant monograph, based on extensive field research in Peru, Colombia and Afghanistan, exploring the political capital developed by participants in drug economies.

Misha Glenny, *McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal Underworld*, New York, Alfred Knopf, 2008.

A journalistic tour d'horizon of contemporary organised crime and its relationship to economic globalisation and local political power.

Crime, Law & Social Change, vol 52, no. 3, 2009, special issue on illicit markets and violence, pp 225-336, <http://www.springerlink.com/content/0925-4994/52/3/>.

An interesting cross-section of contemporary criminological and other views on the relationship between violence and illicit markets. Includes articles addressing the question in relation to drug markets, state-sponsored protection rackets, and political patronage in West Africa, Iraq, Mexico and other markets.

Phil Williams, *Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents*, Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub930.pdf>.

A fascinating examination of the overlooked, but key role played by illicit market dynamics in the Iraqi insurgency. The author had extensive access to American military and law enforcement sources in the preparation of the manuscript.

Bruce Broomhall, "Illicit conflict economies: enhancing the role of law enforcement and financial machinery", report, 23 March 2010, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1590345>.

A report exploring possibilities for joining up international legal and financial-flow norms, particularly around terrorist financing, with international conflict management efforts.

Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, Bloomington, James Currey & Indiana University Press, 1999; and Jean-François Bayart, Stephen Ellis and Beatrice Hibou, *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999.

Two seminal extended essays from the African Issues series exploring kleptocracy, criminal financing and criminalisation as a strategy of rule in Africa.