

# Conference report

## Organised crime, illicit drugs and state vulnerability

International workshop organised by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (NOREF)  
and the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (UTDT)  
Oslo, 4 October 2010

Juan Gabriel Tokatlián

### Executive summary

The power of criminal networks over the international drug economy has been growing in a number of regions, including parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, west Africa, and Russia and Central Asia. The human, social and institutional costs of this phenomenon are immense. The dangers include: the corrosion of vulnerable states as drug money is used to establish control over institutions; the perpetuation of internal conflicts in countries such as Burma and Afghanistan; and a reduction in the authority of international institutions such as the United Nations. This nexus between organised crime, illegal narcotics and the weaker members of the international community is a major problem for states, regions and global governance alike. But to find better ways to address the issue depends on two things: grasping the scale of the failure of the dominant existing prohibitionist model (summarised in the ill-fated notion of a “war on drugs”), and understanding the interrelated dimensions of what is at stake. This was the starting-point of a major workshop held in Oslo in October 2010 under the joint auspices of the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (NOREF) and the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (UTDT).

In this report on the workshop, Juan Gabriel Tokatlián of the UTDT presents a digest of the

key ideas, propositions and conclusions of the international experts who attended the workshop. The discussion voiced criticism of the prevailing approaches to illicit narcotics and concern over the spreading threats to the more vulnerable states in the world order, while seeking new policies that could match the increasing complexity of transnational organised crime. On this basis, the core propositions outlined at the workshop referred to flaws in the international drug regime; the increasing military involvement in drug policy as the issue becomes defined in security terms; violations of human and civil rights as a result of the “war on drugs”; and the hollowing out of institutions as organised crime corrodes or even captures the state.

The recommendations included policies that avoid damaging side-effects and unintended consequences; a wider policy mix that puts social considerations at the centre; new forms of regulation; a focus on peace, sensitivity to local cultures, and the involvement of civil society; and the need for a pragmatic and evidence-based approach. It is hoped that these conclusions will become part of the effort to articulate and implement a shift towards better ways of tackling the major and many-sided aspects of the phenomenon under review.

Juan Gabriel Tokatlián is professor of international relations at the *Universidad Torcuato Di Tella* in Buenos Aires. He was awarded a PhD by the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. He was co-founder (1982) and director (1987-94) of the Centro de Estudios Internacionales (CEI) at the Universidad de los Andes, associate professor (1995-98) at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, and senior researcher at the Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI) (all in Bogotá). Juan Gabriel Tokatlián has published extensively on Colombian and Argentinean foreign policies; on US-Latin American relations; on drug trafficking, organised violence and terrorism in the Americas; and on global politics and dynamics. His most recent book is *La guerra contra las drogas en el mundo andino*, Buenos Aires, Editorial del Zorzal (2009).

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## Introduction

Crime, particularly that form of delinquency linked to the narcotics business, is a major source of violence, corruption, and insecurity in several of the world's countries. The uncontrolled advance of powerful, drug-related, globally-intertwined criminal organisations puts both human rights and peace at risk.

In this context, a workshop convened in Oslo in October 2010 under the joint auspices of the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre (NOREF) and the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (UTDT), provided an opportunity for international experts to understand and evaluate the complex linkages between organised crime, illicit drugs, and state vulnerability.

Crime linked to the narcotics business is a major source of violence, corruption and insecurity.

The workshop opened with the setting out of a general framework designed to identify the most recent changes with respect to these issues. It continued by presenting “state of the art” research on the main topics, in which various perspectives were considered: the situation at the level of the United

Nations; the diagnosis by and policies of the European Union; the United States's domestic and international strategies; the violent evolution of the “war on drugs” in Latin America (with particular attention to Colombia and Mexico); the significant development of drug-trafficking in west Africa; the mounting role of Russia and central Asia with regard to drugs and organised crime; and the recent experiences of Burma and Afghanistan, where long-standing conflicts have been linked to the drug question.

The workshop discussed many dimensions of these problems, and voiced criticism of the prohibitionist paradigm on account of its negative effects and unintended consequences. There were also specific recommendations for a better approach, based on a shift toward conflict-sensitive drug policies (both long- and short-term) which should be implemented by a range of actors, including non-governmental ones.

## Framework

Three issues provided the initial framework of the discussion: the increasing complexity and assertiveness of transnational organised crime, enduring disappointment with the international system of narcotics prohibition, and rising concern over the fragility of states.

### **Growing complexity**

Organised crime was defined as an actor in 2000 by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. At the time, this very codification helped generate a relative consensus among the parties. Since then, however, its shortcomings with regard to the measurement and evaluation of this form of crime have become apparent. In particular, basing the approach to organised crime on a juridical definition has led to an emphasis on the law-enforcement side of understanding and coping with the phenomenon, to the detriment of a broader sociological and economic approach.

Organised crime involves new forms of a more complex and bold criminality, with extensive transnational links.

Yet neither is the latter sufficient on its own. The evolution of organised crime in different contexts makes it misleading to treat it just as a case of emerging violent groups

associated with multiple illegal commodities or enterprises; for (as with any other social category or class) these groupings also search for and sometimes achieve economic power, social recognition, and political influence.

A key consideration then suggests itself: that the phenomenon of organised crime involves new forms of a more complex and bold criminality, with extensive transnational links and global reach. The evolution of these forms has resulted in a gradual consolidation of powerful criminal organisations, some of which acquire the capacity to influence and control significant aspects of the social, economic, and political life of different nations.

### **Beyond prohibition**

The widespread frustration with drugs policies based on prohibition is mounting everywhere, though with regional (west-east and north-south) differences. The combination of scepticism about the “war on drugs” and the scale of the post-2007 financial crisis provides an opportunity for a fruitful debate about current drug-control practices and what could follow prohibitionism.

The severe problems of the world’s economy have exposed the flaws of the neo-liberal model that has been dominant for two decades, and a reassessment of the state and its regulatory role. The view has evolved that two things are needed: more and better regulation in different areas of the economy, and an institutional strengthening of government. One such area is more rigorous control of offshore banking and international tax-havens, an end to unnecessary banking secrecy, and controls over capital flight.

The signs of change in relation to the state (and associated matters of values, social costs and security, and inequality) both affect and are interlinked with the drug phenomenon, in a way that creates a fruitful context for exploring more creative policies. The historical moment contains both encouraging and worrying developments in this respect: the fortieth anniversary of Richard Nixon’s famous (or infamous) call for a “war on drugs” arrives in 2011, while the centenary of the first convention on opium follows in 2012. This is surely an appropriate time for a comprehensive assessment of the existing paradigm – and potential alternatives.

### **The vulnerability of states**

The return of interest in the state has another dimension in relation to some states in the global south that are either producers of drugs or major trafficking-points. Since the 1990s, academic and policy-making arguments about the nature of various types of state have tended to view the problems of southern states through the conceptual lens of “collapsed state” or “fragile state”. The danger here is of a bias that fails to grasp the complexity of the phenomena. But over the 2000s, there has been some refinement of definitions and improvement in understanding. A critical question now is how to avoid seeing the weakening of states as a “natural” feature of global politics, but rather as the result of determinant historical factors.

### **Viewpoints**

The one-day workshop covered a lot of ground and generated rich ideas and conclusions. The most important propositions – fifteen in all – were as follows:

### **Regime of compromise**

The international drug regime, centred mainly around the global conventions and handled by specialised United Nations agencies and policy guidelines, has been based on a sort of compromise that is increasingly unsustainable. This mixes a US hard line with a European Union soft line in a way that is both uneasy (for not everywhere is there a “crusade” against drugs) and unbalanced (for it is insensitive to the many local and regional variations of supply and demand, consumption and production, prohibition and permissiveness).

There are critical and unresolved problems at the UN level.

### **A problematic United Nations**

There are critical and unresolved problems at the UN level. They include the rigidity and (in some cases) anachronism of legal instruments such as protocols and treaties; problems of funding the UN’s relevant offices (related to the origin, amount, and scope of the moneys); problems in the quality of the data collected (low), the methodology applied (poor), the evaluation implemented (biased); and a lack of coordination and effective action among the institution’s diverse agencies. There is no system-wide coherence: the INCB, UNODC, UNAIDS, WHO and the UNCHR each has different and sometimes conflicting policies on drugs.

### **An ambivalent Europe**

The European Union has devoted more attention to the issue of drugs over the years, as part of both its security and foreign policy. In some respects the EU has been a leading actor in the area – for example, in collaborating with some Latin American countries to promote the notion of shared responsibility vis-à-vis the drug phenomenon. But in no way has it offered a distinct alternative to the US’s major strategies and policies on narcotics. And there are inconsistencies across the union: several EU member-states countries apply a harm-reduction policy at the level of consumption, while others support a tougher approach focusing on drug cultivation, production and trafficking.

### **Concern over organised crime**

The EU is the second biggest market in terms of the global consumption of illicit drugs, though its “usage dynamics” vary greatly (for example, cocaine dominates in the west, designer drugs in the centre, and heroin in the east). The major worry for European governments is organised crime and its spreading networks both inside several EU member-states and among the EU’s neighbours; the alleged linkages between migration, drug-trafficking and crime also cause great anxiety, as do especially damaging forms of drug use and the entry of new substances into the European market. These trends raise concerns that the policy response will allow security considerations to override developmental concerns.

### **A losing “war on drugs”**

The US global and domestic anti-narcotics strategy, founded on tough policies and rhetoric and lasting for decades, has won few battles and failed to win its war. The manifold dominance of punitive tactics and measures is reflected in its intertwined purposes: to reduce cultivation and to improve eradication in order to discourage peasants to cultivate illicit crops (even though eradication often leads to an increase in prices); to strengthen interdiction at the level of the processing and transit countries in order to limit the availability and potency of drugs in the US; and to enhance seizures at US borders to reduce supply, to raise the domestic price of narcotics, and thus deter further potential consumers from entering the drug market.

The efforts of US state agencies notwithstanding (including an unprecedented level of imprisonment for drug offences), it is clear that this policy is close to collapse. Most illegal drugs are more easily available in the US now, with greater purity and at a lower price, than in the early 1980s.

### **Critical collateral damage**

In the United States, Republicans and Democrats alike have been responsible for the drug-policy fiasco. The repressive and supply-oriented policy of defining drugs as an overwhelming threat to national security has entailed much greater involvement by the military in ill-defined law-enforcement tasks at home and abroad; created a few winners, but very many losers; and – contrary



to what was expected and desired – allowed US-centred organised crime and transnational criminal organisations to become richer and more powerful, while making US citizens less safe and turning more of them into victims.

### ***Deteriorating diplomacy***

The ill-conceived “war on drugs”, concentrating as it has on the supply side of the narcotics question, has created enormous social, political, ecological and military difficulties across North, Central and South America. These include human-rights abuses, environmental catastrophes, unbalanced civil-military relations, institutional corruption, massive civil-rights violations, a concentration of power in drug mafias, and failures of law-enforcement. The strains are deeply felt in the conduct of “narcodiplomacy”,<sup>1</sup> where relations between Washington and Latin American capitals have deteriorated in recent years.

### ***Regional quagmire***

The effects of drug production and trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean have been both significant and destructive. A single example suffices to make the point. In the early 1980s, Bolivia and Peru were the sole key coca producers, while Colombia was the main site where coca paste

The ill-conceived “war on drugs” has created enormous social, ecological and military difficulties.

was processed into cocaine. Today, all three countries are major producers of coca.

The geographical expansion of coca cultivation has meant the deforestation of hundreds of thousands of hectares of the Amazon basin, and the downgrading of soils as chemicals are used to transform coca into cocaine, and government authorities employ chemicals to fumigate coca crops. A drug business once perceived as a localised phenomenon (confined to the Andean ridge) has become a fully regional dilemma (stretching from Mexico and the Caribbean

basin to Brazil, intersecting the Andes and the Amazon, the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, North and South America).

### ***A civil-military shift***

The effect of drug policy on human-rights violations was most dramatically seen in the 1990s in Peru and Colombia. Today major violations are closely linked to drug policy and the drug business’s proliferation in Mexico, Brazil, Central America and the Caribbean, Afghanistan and Burma.

In the Andean region, Mexico and Central America, the civil-military balance has moved in favour of the military since the 1990s as the military increasingly take responsibility for counter-narcotics tasks that should belong to the police and law-enforcement agencies. This shift in the institutional framework of security and the control of public order has had negative effects both on the region’s democratic evolution and on the prospects for local communities to develop and find alternative livelihoods.

### ***The corrosion of the state***

Several countries in North, Central and South America have experienced a collapse of the judicial system as a result of the use (and threats) of violence, and tactics of bribery and corruption employed by sophisticated mafias. Drug syndicates, now more globalised than ever, have brought the law-enforcement capabilities of even more countries to the brink.

The high levels of corruption have reached the upper echelons of government in several Latin American states, creating the fear that – unless the trend is reversed, and new and bold drug policies are introduced – “narco-states” could be established in the near future. Drug money has directly bought or influenced senior government officials, congressmen and security forces in the region. In many Caribbean islands and several small Latin American states, the emergence of financial havens is ominous for their economic development; the effects include a decline in productive investment, a lack of control systems, and the entry of drug-related finance into the political contest.

1 The term “narcodiplomacy” refers to a type of transnational relationship where a strong and influential actor, such as the United States, exports its “war on drugs” to less powerful counterparts. See H. Richard Friman, *Narcodiplomacy: Exporting the US War on Drugs*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1995.

All this plays into the larger context of global and hemispheric factors (economic, geopolitical, and military) and forces (state and non-governmental, transnational and supra-institutional). The interlocking dynamics generates enormous costs for all the countries of the area.

Drug syndicates have brought the law-enforcement capabilities of many countries to the brink.

Similar patterns are visible in Afghanistan, where repressive drug-control policies in the midst of war – such as forced eradication and strict implementation of opium bans – have widened the gap between state and citizens. Moreover, high-ranking officials in the Afghan government have been embroiled in corruption relating to the drug trade.

### **Mexico: the next domino**

The decision of the Barack Obama administration to reinvigorate the “war on drugs” is doomed to fail. The experience of Colombia confirms this. By any measurable standard – cocaine production, drug availability and purity, the level of drug-related violence, the control of narcotics-linked money-laundering, the spread of consumption into new markets – the coercive approach to drugs in Colombia has been a total disappointment.

Plan Colombia – a militarised, decade-long strategy costing \$7 billion – has been wholly unable to curtail the drug phenomenon in the Americas. During its implementation, Bogotá has used chemicals to eradicate illicit crops over a huge part of its territory, extradited more than 1,000 Colombians to the United States, and dismantled the old, big drug cartels and some of the more sophisticated, cell-like, more elusive and smaller “boutique” cartels – yet without solving the drug problem either in the US or the region.

It can be argued that Plan Colombia has been modestly successful as a counterinsurgency initiative – but a complete failure as a counter-drug strategy. Yet its rationale is now embodied in Washington’s Merida Initiative for Mexico and Central America. All the available data indicates that Mexico, the new site of the “war on drugs”, is living through extreme violence and serious instability.

### **Importing a failed model**

Russia and Central Asia are critically affected by the spread of the drug phenomenon. Many of these nations (Russia in particular) are now gravely threatened by the rising availability of heroin and synthetic drugs, the proliferation of narcotics routes, the high number of casualties, and the growing power of organised crime. Here too, the response has been dominated by hardline policies involving severe supply-side and demand-side measures underpinned by the security forces’ active participation; but there is by contrast a lack of demand-reduction initiatives, preventive-health actions, and cooperation among neighbouring countries. Thus Russia and the states in its vicinity have adopted a tough US-style model that – domestically and regionally – is driven by a prohibitionist stance.

### **Africa in the vortex**

The situation regarding the drug economy and organised crime in West Africa is quite worrisome. The narcotics business has expanded dramatically in the region; collusion between drug gangs and state authorities is pervasive. The unprecedented levels of corruption has even led to “state capture” where – in a sort of courtesan state – powerful new actors linked to the drug market gain influence and thus paralyse the ability of governments to implement existing laws and act in the public interest. In turn, the glorification of wealth and easy money extends across a significant part of society, especially the young; and as the modern state ceases to function, some forces (leaders, individuals, and groups) turn to the traditional state as a source of basic order and values.

These dangerous conditions influence the whole of West Africa, yet neither Brussels nor Washington offers the attention, understanding, support, and resources the situation demands. True, the security dimension of the link between drugs and crime is a point of concern for the United States and the European Union; but other core elements of the nexus between drugs and organised crime are not part of any active, positive strategy vis-à-vis West Africa.

### **Linkage of war, drugs, and peace**

The cases of Burma and Afghanistan reveal particular issues and problems. Among them are the relation between drugs and violence, between the domestic and the international, and the impact of ongoing war and conflict. In both countries, any possibility of progress requires conflict-sensitive drug policies, a long-term perspective, sustainable socio-economic measures, avoiding stigmatisation of any of the parties involved, and moves towards statebuilding.

It is imperative too to understand both that drug policies are not neutral in their effects, and that they should take global and regional markets into account. This awareness must be a strategic priority in the search for peace in environments affected by drugs and afflicted by war.

### **A painful allegory**

It is now evident that the “war on drugs” is far more than a metaphor. In the Andean ridge and Mexico, in west Africa and Central Asia, it has become a militarised crusade against narcotics; several thousand soldiers are directly involved in anti-drugs operations worldwide; and hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent in armed combat against drug-consumers, drug-traffickers, drug-producers, drug-launders, and drug-lords.

The leading combatants against narcotics, from Colombia and Guinea-Bissau to Afghanistan, are United States troops and other national contingents. They are constantly engaged in low-intensity irregular warfare against an enemy perceived in terms of the twin threat of illicit business and armed insurgency. The results – measured in terms of crop eradication and substitution, drug interdiction, reduction in trafficking, dismantling of organised crime, curtailment of money-laundering, improvement in statehood, better civil-military relations, and advancement of human rights – have been abysmally poor.

### **Conclusions**

The fifteen key propositions at the Oslo workshop in turn gave rise to a number of conclusions, which mixed general and particular recommendations for action. The most important – ten in all – were as follows:

### **Failed policy**

The “war on drugs” is failing. Thus it is urgent to broaden and improve the current debate in the direction of a paradigm shift. This in turn requires building a coalition of like-minded actors that can facilitate a better and more honest dialogue on alternatives to the current prohibitionist approach. These actors include states, non-governmental groups, and international agencies.

### **Lost legitimacy**

The international drug regime is losing legitimacy and credibility. A new set of principles must emerge and be established in its place. As an example, it could be made clear that measures stemming from the illicit-drugs regime must not collide with other international regimes (such as those governing human rights, the environment, health, and light weapons). More broadly, governments should attempt to implement consistent and sensitive anti-drug policies that as much as possible avoid damaging side-effects and unintended consequences.

It is imperative to understand that drug policies are not neutral in their effects.

### **Broad public policy**

The drugs issue is a symptom of deeper and more intricate problems. Thus a better drug-control strategy would encompass sound public policies on a range of issues: equity, health, human rights, education, employment, the development of alternative livelihoods. Well-targeted policies on job creation, technical training, education, respect for fundamental rights, access to justice, and health facilities for the young are essential and valuable in themselves; but they are also vital in diminishing and preventing drug abuse among young people.

### **New form of regulation**

An important concept in addressing the drug phenomenon may be *modulated regulation*. This implies the need to create a specific type of drug regulation that is appropriate to the damage caused in each case. It would then be necessary to identify regulatory mechanisms of various kinds throughout the production chain, from demand to supply; the lesson of the existing approach is that operating on a single dimension leads to a dysfunctional situation that only favours transnational organised crime.

To prioritise harm reduction at the level of consumption is positive, but not enough to cope with drug problematics. Every drug, naturally-based or synthetically-designed, is different in its characteristics and effects; there is no overall, single regulatory mode to deal with all of them. Thus, it is fundamental to disaggregate the universe of drugs and established specific regulations for each substance.

Many drug-control measures are counterproductive.

### ***A turn to peace***

Where a country is affected simultaneously by internal armed conflict and the drug business, resolving the first is crucial to dismantling or curtailing the second. A settlement of conflict in ways that allow peace, governance and development to take root has many ensuing benefits: establishing the legitimacy of institutions, reducing post-conflict tensions, and implementing an active and inclusive social policy. To make peace a strategic priority connects domestic agency and international understanding of particular national situations, with both conflict-resolution mechanisms and external good offices vital to progress.

### ***Development and agriculture***

Many drug-control measures are counterproductive. For example, forced and aerial crop-eradication does not work. This too implies that in the policy sequence, development should come first. Peasants in drug-cultivation areas must be considered not as criminal gangs but as partners for development; sustainable, long-term, and context-sensitive agricultural initiatives must be implemented; empowering legal, region-wide actors is important; local, effective governance based on the rule of law remains fundamental; awareness of a community culture is imperative; and attention to the impact of market dynamics on drugs at local, national, and international levels is needed.

### ***Rights focus***

In every country and region with a major drug problem – from Mexico to Afghanistan, the Andes to West Africa – human rights are under fire. At the same time, HIV epidemics are growing in places where the use of injection drugs is extensive. In Russia, Central and South-East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, the rising availability of drugs is intertwined with an increase in HIV infections.

Both indices of human vulnerability and suffering demand more global sensitivity. For example, countries with a positive record on human rights and health could combine with international organisations (such as the World Health Organisation, UN-Aids, Amnesty International and the Committee to Protect Journalists) to advocate human-rights protection and HIV/Aids prevention as parts of a connected cause.

### ***Governance issue***

It is important to see organised crime in holistic terms. In Europe and the United States, the phenomenon is viewed as a core security issue, linked to terrorism and the problem of “failed states”. But in Latin America and West Africa, it is viewed as a basic governance issue, associated with external vulnerability and weak domestic institutions.

This difference of perspective – reflecting differences between north and south on other matters – may have negative consequences for all the parties involved. A more systemic, balanced, and shared perspective is very much needed. This could be advanced by creating new “trilateral” (US-EU-Latin America) and multilateral (US-EU-Latin America-Asia-Africa) connections to debate organised crime.

### ***Civil-society effort***

The concerns over organised crime, illicit drugs, and state vulnerability are not confined to governments alone. Many sectors of society are affected by them and could play a significant role in responding to them. It should be possible to increase the number and quality of regional and global partnerships among NGOs, think-tanks and research centres studying these issues and coordinate grassroots activities related to them.

The bodies that could be included in such initiatives include the International Drug Policy Consortium, the International Harm Reduction Association, the Transnational Institute, the Washington Office on Latin America, the Drug Law Reform Project, the Asian Harm Reduction Network, the Latin American Initiative on Drugs and Democracy, the Middle East and North Africa Harm Reduction Association, the Nigeria-based Centre for Research and Information



on Substance Abuse, and the US-based Drug Policy Alliance and Common Sense for Drug Policy. It is essential to strengthen the contacts and actions between such organisations.

### **Question of framing**

A reasonable and effective policy on drugs and organised crime needs good, reliable information. A pragmatic and evidence-based approach will be far more beneficial than one founded on the crusade-driven dogma of the “war on drugs” and “zero tolerance”.

This reveals the importance of discourse and framing in domestic and international drug strategies. A more responsible vocabulary is needed, where ideological and polarised debate (such as presenting the only available choices as pure prohibition or full legalisation) is avoided. Rigorous factual investigation has already demonstrated the limits of the current paradigm; in the same spirit, clear usage of the right words to convey a comprehensible message is central to convey the merits and virtues of alternative approaches.

In turn, this implies the need for a broader, sophisticated, reformist knowledge community – composed of officials, policymakers, researchers,

public figures, media communicators, political leaders, and civic organisations – to emerge and influence the drug debate at national, regional and global levels.

A final note may be appropriate. Henry Barrett Chamberlin, who was responsible for the Chicago Crime Commission in the early 1930s, asserted: “It is a dream of the visionary that someday an aroused public opinion will eliminate organized crime. This vision is Utopian. Organized crime will never be eliminated but it may be minimized and controlled.” Thus, “organized crime is today a great, unmanageable threatening fact in the lives of our communities. It is not enough to ask whether the machinery of law enforcement is good... Organized crime succeeds because of public apathy. Suppression of crime is spasmodic because public interest in its success and indignation at its failure is sporadic.”<sup>2</sup>

In light of this and all the foregoing, the best practical option available is to seek to contain this phenomenon while in parallel empowering a more stable, transparent, and democratic state.

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<sup>2</sup> Henry Barrett Chamberlin, “Some Observations Concerning Organized Crime”, *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, vol 22, no. 5, 1932, p 670.



## Annex 1: Workshop programme

### Organized Crime, Illicit Drugs and State Vulnerability

Oslo, 4 October 2010

Björvika Konferansesenter, room "Hovinbekken"

#### AGENDA

8.30-8.45: **General Introduction**

**Mariano Aguirre**, *Managing Director, Noref*, and **Juan Gabriel Tokatlián**, *Universidad Torcuato Di Tella*

8.45-10.15: **First Panel: The United Nations and the European Union**

**Francisco Thoumi**, *Member of the Editorial Board of Razón Pública*

"The Role of the UN in the Global Work to Combat Drugs and Organized Crime"

**Ivan Briscoe**, *Research Fellow in Governance at the Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute of International Affairs (The Hague)*

"European Union Strategies and Policies vis-à-vis Drugs and Organized Crime"

10.15-10.30 **Coffee Break**

10.30-12.15: **Second Panel: Drugs and Organized Crime in the Americas**

**Bruce Bagley**, *Department of International Studies, University of Miami*: "United States"

**Mónica Serrano**, *Executive Director of the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect and Professor of International Relations at El Colegio de México*:

"Colombia and Mexico"

12.15-13.45: **Lunch**

13.45-15.15: **Third Panel: Drugs and Organized Crime in Africa and Asia**

**Dr. Ekaterina Stepanova**, *Lead Researcher, IMEMO (Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, Moscow)*: "Russia and the former Soviet republics"

**Kwesi Aning**, *Head of the Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution Department of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Accra, Ghana)*: "West Africa"

**Tom Kramer**, *Researcher, Drugs & Democracy Program, Transnational Institute*:

"Afghanistan and Burma"

15.15-15.45: **Concluding Remarks**

## Annex 2: Speakers

**Dr Kwesi Aning** currently serves as Head, Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution Department (CPMRD) of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KA IPTC) in Accra, Ghana. Prior to taking up his new position in January 2007, he served as the African Union's first Expert on counterterrorism, defense and security. Dr. Aning holds a doctorate from the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His primary research interests deal with African security issues, comparative politics, terrorism and conflicts. He has taught in several universities in Europe and Africa and has authored several publications. In 2007, he served as a senior consultant to the UN Department for Political Affairs, New York, and completed a UN Secretary-General's report on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, particularly the African Union, in maintaining peace and security.

**Dr. Bruce Michael Bagley** holds a PhD in political science from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He is Professor of International Studies and Chair of the Department of International Studies at the University of Miami (UM), Coral Gables, Florida. He also served as the Director of UM's Center of Latin American Studies (CLAS) in 2007-08. His recent publications include: "**Colombia y la guerra contra las drogas**", *Foreign Affairs En Español*, (January-March 2008); *Globalisation and Latin American and Caribbean Organised Crime*, (Routledge, 2005); editor of *Drug Trafficking Research in the Americas: A Bibliographic Survey*, (Lynne Rienner, 1997); and co-editor, with William Walker, of *Drug Trafficking in the Americas* (Transaction, 1995). Professor Bagley's current research focuses on US - Latin American relations, with an emphasis on drug trafficking and security issues in Colombia, the Andean region, and Mexico. Dr. Bagley occasionally serves as an expert consultant for the United Nations (United Nations Development Program - UNDP), for the US Government (Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration), and for several governments in Latin America (Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia Panama and Mexico) on issues of drug trafficking, money laundering and public security. Dr. Bagley has also testified in US Federal courts on numerous occasions as an expert witness on drug trafficking and organized crime issues relating to Latin America.

**Ivan Briscoe** is a fellow in governance at the Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute of International Affairs, in The Hague. A specialist in fragile states, he has recently undertaken field-based studies of the links between state institutions and organized crime in Guatemala and Kosovo. He has written on the dynamics of Latin American frontiers, state capture, counter-narcotic policy and broader political developments in the region in research reports and the media. His most recent work includes studies of the effects of militia demobilization in Colombia and the possibilities of economic recovery in Burundi. Previously he worked as a journalist and editor in Latin America, France and Spain.

**Tom Kramer** is a researcher for the Transnational Institute's Drugs and Democracy Programme. He is a political scientist with over 15 years experience on Burma and its border regions, which he has visited regularly since 1993. His work focuses on developing a better understanding of the drugs market in the region as a whole, the relationship between production and consumption, and alternative development (AD). Together with the Drugs and Democracy Programme, Kramer has created a regional network of local researchers, and is also carrying out advocacy towards policymakers in the region for more sustainable drug policies. Since 2005 Kramer also works on Afghanistan, with a focus on the relationship between drugs and conflict, and the involvement of western security forces in counter narcotic activities. Apart from his work for TNI, he is also a writer and freelance consultant, specializing in ethnic conflict and civil society in Burma. He has carried out field research and written reports for a wide range of international NGOs, institutes and UN organisations.

**Mónica Serrano** is Executive Director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. She is Professor of International Relations at El Colegio de México and a Senior Research Associate at the Centre for International Studies, Oxford University. After gaining her DPhil from Oxford, she was a Research Fellow and Honorary Fellow at the Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, a Research Associate at the IISS, and a MacArthur Research Fellow at Oxford University's Centre for International Studies. She has written extensively on international security, and the

international relations of Latin America, with particular reference to international institutions, security, transnational crime and civil-military relations. Dr Serrano is the author and editor of numerous publications including: *Transnational Organised Crime and International Security: Business as Usual?* (Lynne Rienner, 2002); *Regionalism and Governance in the Americas: Continental Drift* (Palgrave, 2005); *Human Rights Regimes in the Americas* (UNU Press, 2009) and *Transitional Justice and Democratic Consolidation: Eastern Europe and Latin America in Comparative Perspective* (UNU Forthcoming). She is a member of the editorial board of the *Global Responsibility to Protect* and the *Journal Conflict, Security and Development* as well as an editor of the Routledge Book Series *Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect*.

**Dr Ekaterina Stepanova** is a Lead Researcher at IMEMO (Institute of the World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences), where she has worked since 2001. She specializes on the study of armed conflicts and other forms of collective violence and the political economy of conflicts. She lectures at the European University in Saint Petersburg (EUSP) and is a visiting lecturer at European Peace University (EPU), Austria. In 2007–2009, she was on leave from IMEMO to lead the *Armed Conflicts and Conflict Management* programme at SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute). Dr Stepanova is the author of six books in English, Russian and Spanish, including *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects* (Oxford University Press, 2008; Buenos Aires, 2009; Moscow, 2010). Her previous monograph, *The Role of Illicit Drug Business in the Political Economy of Conflicts and Terrorism* (Moscow, 2005), was a comparative analysis of the political economy of drugs and conflicts in Afghanistan, Colombia and Burma. Her most recent co-edited volume is *Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalization* (Sage, 2009). She serves on the editorial boards of the journals *Terrorism and Political Violence* and *Security Index*.

**Francisco E. Thoumi** is a Colombian-American economist. He obtained his PhD in Economics at the University of Minnesota. He is the author of *Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia* (1995), and *Illegal Drugs, Economy and Society in the Andes* (2003). He has written over 50 book chapters and academic articles and edited three volumes on the illegal drug industry in the Andes. He has been Research Coordinator for the Global Programme Against Money Laundering of the UNODCCP, a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Director of the Center for International Studies at the Universidad de Los Andes in Bogota, and Tinker Visiting Professor of Latin American Studies at the University of Texas.